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FOREWORD
In the information domain, the U.S. Army is an
attractive target for adversary commanders and fighters, terrorist groups, and disaffected individuals. There
are many risks to Army command and control (C2)
operations and to intelligence and information warfare
(IW) capabilities. Challenges are likely to include: significant uncertainty; sudden unexpected events; high
noise and clutter levels in intelligence pictures; basic
and complex deceptions exercised through a variety
of channels; the actions of hidden malign actors; and
novel forms of attack on U.S. and allied command,
control, communications, computers, information/
intelligence, surveillance, targeting acquisition, and
reconnaissance (C4ISTAR) systems.
Dr. John A. S. Ardis and Dr. Shima D. Keene have
between them many years’ experience in intelligence,
counterintelligence, counterterrorism, and scientific
innovation. In this monograph, the authors explore
the risks and instabilities that could threaten the U.S.
Army’s control of the complex informational and physical environments. They argue that the complexities
and uncertainties of the environments are legitimate
and perennial characteristics of an increasingly connected world. They suggest that the U.S. Army should
seek to exploit complexity and uncertainty and not
simply try to overcome it using technical intelligence
and human sources. To achieve such exploitation will
require rich innovation, extensive training, rigorous
testing, and expert integration and coordination.
The authors put forward concepts for special information operations (SIO) that are appropriate for the
forthcoming challenges. They highlight the value of
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developing an advanced counterintelligence capability
and introduce the concepts of signature warfare, sublime operations, and other novel techniques.
To achieve and maintain information dominance,
the U.S. Army must adapt, learn, and develop. This
monograph contributes to that development by identifying risks and proposing mitigations that can provide
operational advantage.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.
Director
Strategic Studies Institute and
U.S. Army War College Press
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SUMMARY
The U.S. Army is committed to a high state of resilience and readiness. The problem is that for complex
environments, the U.S. Army cannot afford simply
to be very effective in a known set of circumstances
and unprepared for others, and neither can it afford to
be no more than moderately capable in the broadest
possible range of circumstances. The U.S. Army has to
be effective across the board, and that places extraordinary demands on its Soldiers during all phases of
preparation for and engagement in conflict.
Dominance in the information space is a critical capability that will enable the U.S. Army to determine
if, how, and when it will engage in conflict. For the
U.S. Army to achieve and maintain information dominance, it will have to advance its capabilities to the
point where it can rapidly and effectively deploy capabilities that outmaneuver advanced, well-resourced,
and unconstrained threats under very difficult circumstances. This will require innovation, planning, and
resilience, allowing its information capabilities to survive complex, premeditated, and asymmetric attack.
In addition to deploying advanced information related capabilities (IRCs), the U.S. Army has to protect its
own capabilities (including those of joint forces and
allies) while degrading the adversary’s capabilities.1
This monograph explores some example risks and
suggests that, when combating an unconstrained adversary, training and preparing a suite of novel and
tested operations is a necessary complement to the
U.S. Army’s current warfighting capabilities.
The risks to information dominance are varied.
Examples include the likelihood that potential adversaries are already committed to aggressive infor-
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mation activities ranging from elementary deception
operations to the nuanced use of multiple channels to
achieve information and physical sabotage. It is also
likely that there will be a further proliferation of communications and cyber technologies allowing nations,
terrorist groups, and even individuals to corrupt, jam,
and spoof U.S. Army communications; interrupt the
supply chain; and possibly degrade command and
control systems.
The tempo of information warfare may increase
to the point where the mean time between significant
events is shorter than the time needed to generate rational decisions or resolve ambiguities. This will challenge even the most expert decision-maker. Some nations will field highly protected special capabilities, so
the U.S. Army will have to account for advanced information warfare methods and systems in the Joint Plan,
even when the adversary’s capabilities are unknown.
It may also be increasingly challenging for all participants to discriminate between real and decoy physical targets in congested and noisy environments―even
with advanced sensors.
In order to achieve and maintain information dominance, the U.S. Army must exploit the complexity and
uncertainty of the battlespace and not simply seek to
overcome it. As part of this venture, the U.S. Army must
be prepared to field robust and potentially complex deceptions in support of its strategic objectives―enough
to overmatch the adversary’s counter-deception
capabilities.
The U.S. Army’s prowess in conventional warfighting should be augmented by the exploitation of a
variety of advanced special operations in the technological and informational domains, expertly and rapidly integrated, using multiple tested outcome strat-

xiv

egies that will survive and succeed under uncertain
and very aggressive circumstances. The proficient use
of special information operations (SIO) will create cumulative effects, where each operation magnifies the
effect of those already undertaken, and prepares the
ground for subsequent operations. SIO are particularly useful when the commander wishes to put the adversary on the back foot, and, as such, they are one of
the most cost-effective and low-risk means by which
the U.S. Army can achieve and maintain information
dominance.
The U.S. Army should field a strong tactical and
operational level active counterintelligence capability
that deliberately targets adversary intelligence functions and undertakes various activities to mislead
and degrade them. In particular, we note that the U.S.
Army’s existing integration staff within the Army Capabilities Integration Center (ARCIC) are pivotal in
the process of coordinating the significant conventional warfighting and information capabilities along with
additional special capabilities.2 The integration process exists in the preparatory stages (led by ARCIC),
and also during conflict (within the U.S. Army and
at the joint level). We present recommendations that
will support the U.S. Army’s need to seize the initiative and deploy coordinated operations that protect its
assets and Soldiers, and manipulate and penetrate the
mind of the adversary commander, leaving him confused and ineffective.

xv

ENDNOTES - SUMMARY
1. Headquarters, Department of the Army, Information Operations, Field Manual 100-6, Washington, DC: U.S. Government
Printing Office, August 1996, pp. 1-9.
2. The Army Capabilities Integration Center’s (ARCIC) role
is defined in the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command
(TRADOC), U.S. Department of the Army, Concept Development,
Capabilities Determination, and Capabilities Integration, TRADOC
Pamphlet 71-20, Joint Base Langley-Eustis, VA: U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, June 28, 2013, p. 16.

xvi

MAINTAINING INFORMATION DOMINANCE
IN COMPLEX ENVIRONMENTS
INTRODUCTION
Despite being over 20 years old, the U.S. Army’s
definition of information dominance from 1996
remains valid. It is defined as:
the degree of information superiority that allows the
possessor to use information systems and capabilities
to achieve an operational advantage in a conflict or to
control the situation in operations short of war, while
denying those capabilities to the adversary.1

The U.S. Army is well-positioned to seize the initiative and develop sustainable measures that will support its role as the leading component of a coordinated
information operations (IO) force. In order for the U.S.
Army to exercise advantage through information dominance, its key underlying concepts, characteristics,
risks, and opportunities, need to be fully appreciated
and analyzed. A program of innovation and analysis
should be implemented in order to equip the future
commander with the options to overmatch adversaries
in all environments.
This monograph explores some example risks
and suggests that, when combating an unconstrained
adversary, the preparation of a suite of novel and
tested operations will complement the U.S. Army’s
warfighting capabilities. The environments may be
congested and all participants will be subject to significant forms of uncertainty, but the U.S. Army should
exploit the complexity and uncertainties by being able
to rapidly deploy operations that prevent the adversary from functioning and making rational decisions.
1

PART 1: EMERGING CHALLENGES
Information dominance has three main applications: command and control (C2), defense intelligence, and information warfare (IW).2 C2 enables
everyone to know where they and their cohorts are
in the battlespace, and allows them to execute operations promptly when necessary. Defense intelligence
ranges from knowing the enemy’s dispositions to
knowing the location of enemy assets in real time with
sufficient precision for a one-shot kill. IW confounds
enemy information systems at various points (sensors,
communications, processing, and command), while
protecting one’s own. The ultimate target of IW is the
information dependent process.3 The U.S. Army needs
to deploy information related capabilities (IRCs) in
support of its objectives and protect its own capabilities, while degrading the adversary’s capabilities.
Technologies and Proliferation
The pace of technological advancements in recent
years has resulted in the erosion of military dominance in the information technology domain. Potential and actual adversaries are beginning to develop
offensive and defensive IRCs that rival, and in some
cases, surpass those of the U.S. Army. As technologies become more available and affordable, adversary
tactics could evolve to exploit asymmetric advantages, gaining advantage over conventional modes
of operation. Adversaries will employ the full range
of emerging technologies in warfare to include cyber
and advanced electronic warfare.4 For example, North
Korea’s interest in cyberattacks, malware, and espionage is of particular concern to South Korea as well as
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the United States. North Korea also reportedly undertakes ambitious hacking to subvert and deny services
in other countries.5 For adversaries, IW can provide a
rapid and cost effective advantage because it is generally perceived as an accessible weapon.
Additionally, with the proliferation of communications technologies and the attractiveness of information as a ubiquitous lever or weapon, the information
environment and the electromagnetic spectrum have
become congested and cluttered. The Defense
Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) is
seeking proposals to help contain the risks, but on a
global scale, a lack of regulation may cause persistent
interference.6 As a result, it has become increasingly
difficult to verify the success or failure of information
activities. Many groups and individuals clamor to
promote their own views and messages to a diverse
audience, using Internet connectivity, social media,
and encrypted smartphones encouraging an accelerating tempo of exchange and coordination of action.
The result is that it has become increasingly difficult
to prevent the flow of adversary intelligence and communications. The Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS),
for example, uses off-the-record protocols, meaning
that it has end-to-end encryption at low cost, between
multiple parties, using mobile phones as platforms.
Friendly intelligence agencies can obtain the communications metadata, but the messages themselves may
be inaccessible.7
New technologies help us understand what communications are being used and can provide valuable access and insight. However, in times of major
upheaval, the sheer bulk of encrypted and open communications threatens to overwhelm media and intelligence services. A case is point was the “Arab Spring”
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uprising where events moved so quickly in a short
period of time that it was not possible to anticipate
outcomes with any degree of certainty.8
The Complex Environment
Complexity and rapid change characterize today’s
strategic environment, driven by globalization, the
diffusion of technology, and demographic shifts.9

The information environment and the physical
environment are both complex, making the task of
measuring the effects of IO even harder.10 This complexity also challenges the U.S. Army’s intelligence
and counterintelligence processes by providing cover
for adversary activities, such as the infiltration of
industry and commercial organizations.11
Adversaries may exploit multiple lines of communication and develop bespoke intelligence channels
that are hard to intercept. At the same time, sociotechnical events in the areas of interest may provide
erratic intelligence flows, placing difficult demands on
intelligence staff, and increasing the level of noise and
interruption. Adversaries, both state and non-state,
may recruit, indoctrinate, and train expert hackers
and cyber specialists, and they will target U.S. Army
and other U.S. services and assets. For example, U.S.
cybersecurity firm Mandiant released a report identifying the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA),
specifically Unit 61398, as the perpetrator of a huge
number of aggressive cyberattacks. The report provides robust and comprehensive evidence to substantiate its deductions.12
The theft, subversion, and complication of data
would reduce our ability to achieve a credible and
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reliable “whole system” picture of both friendly and
adversary activities, further increasing the effort
required to achieve insight and to support decisionmaking. In these convoluted circumstances, planners
and commanders must understand the important relationships between targets, audiences and adversaries,
their environment, and neutral actors. The combination of the adversary, neutral actors, and allied forces
will constitute a set of interconnected complex systems, themselves connected to, and part of, the overall
environment.13
In summary, adversary intelligence functions and
their C2 systems may be robust and unpredictable.
It must also be recognized that an adversary could
degrade allied information networks through a variety
of means, to include physical sabotage, cyber methods,
or misdirection.14 As such, an understanding of the relevant indicators and warnings for the whole spectrum
of threats is necessary to be able to make progress
while uncertainty remains.15 This will also facilitate
the making of good decisions under difficult circumstances. However, an appreciation that what worked
last time might not work next time is also necessary
as well as an acceptance of unfamiliar and ill-defined
risks.16
Unrestricted Adversaries
The first rule of unrestricted warfare is that there are no
rules.17

Present and future adversaries may not be bound
by the same rules of engagement as the U.S. Army,
other U.S. services, or their allies. Some of the U.S.
Army’s potential competitors are already committed
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to aggressive information activities ranging from elementary but effective disinformation operations to the
nuanced use of multiple channels. For example, ISIS
produced propaganda material responding to President Donald Trump’s ban on immigration from certain countries, claiming that Islam cannot be defeated.
While President Trump has not asserted any intention
to defeat Islam, the message remains potent because
there is a willing audience.18
As diverse information channels and tools become
cheaper and more readily available, terrorist groups
will adopt some of the methods and systems that
would previously have been exercised at a national
level. For example, in addition to recruiting fighters from the global pool by use of carefully targeted
multilingual information campaigns, ISIS exploits an
effective propaganda machine within the territories it
already controls.
ISIS also runs a sophisticated operation within the
caliphate to brainwash the population it rules. The
group has set up ‘media points’ in the cities it controls to
maximize the exposure of its propaganda to the public.
Videos, audio files, and other promotional materials are
available directly from the media points using USB flash
drives and SIM cards.19

While the propaganda may not be entirely credible,
and is likely to appear biased by its target audience,
constant exposure can be an effective approach:
a majority of people don’t believe [ISIS propaganda], but
that coupled with a lack of any other information will
impact thinking and decision-making, . . . It’s totalitarian
politicking. You can really break down someone’s ability
to resist the state.20
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Furthermore, as the territory under direct ISIS control
has shrunk because of Coalition military efforts, ISIS
has successfully stepped up its online activities inciting individuals to carry out acts of violence in European cities.
Exposure and bias reinforce the beliefs of the terrorist. The U.S. Army should not assume that telling
the truth will persuade, as plausibility is not always
an adversary objective.21 Criminal and terrorist perspectives may be driven often by what they want to
believe.22 Terrorist groups are now able to assemble
a large enough number of fighters to rival a nation’s
army.23 This poses the risk that the U.S. Army may have
to engage in large-scale conflicts at short notice, with
ill-defined adversaries that use asymmetric methods,
in difficult physical and informational environments.
While such variety and lack of definition may reduce
the effectiveness of the assembled adversaries to some
degree, they remain able to reestablish relationships
rapidly without the need for top-down coordination.
They may never be as efficient as the U.S. Army, but
they may be robust, unpredictable, and highly agile.
The Headline Challenges
Against a backdrop of proliferating communications technologies, complexity, and unregulated
activities by many belligerent groups, the most urgent
challenges that face the U.S. Army in the pursuit of
information dominance may be seen to be the sheer
amount of information available to the intelligence
staff and the commander. This is normally augmented
by the proliferation of devices such as mobile phones
throughout the world, and the adversary’s aggressive
use of information, including the sabotage of allied
media and narratives.
7

The Data Deluge
There is a huge amount of data accessible through
secret intelligence, open source intelligence, and multimedia streams 24 hours a day, 365 days a year. This
presents the intelligence analyst, commander, and
decision-maker with the problem of identifying and
extracting information that is urgent, important, relevant, and true from the vast bulk that is none of these.
The U.S. Army Operating Concept states an important
but sometimes overlooked principle:
because of limitations associated with human cognition
and because much of the information obtained in war is
contradictory or false, more information will not equate
to better understanding.24

Advances in managing “big data” will mitigate this
risk.25 For example, work undertaken by organizations
such as Sandia, a subsidiary of Honeywell International, Inc., will help make sense of massive amounts
of data.26 Automatic feature extraction will assist the
analyst and enable wide area surveillance, providing
earlier warnings of threats and items of interest.27 Such
technologies also help discover denial and deception
by identifying anomalous relationships. There will
remain challenges when the data has deliberately
been corrupted, for example, under conditions of an
adversary’s deception. Determining whether data is
corrupted requires a high degree of analysis, with limitations on the rate that data can impact the decision
making processes. This is relevant to the U.S. Army
because the adversary will exacerbate uncertainties in
order to slow down the Army’s intelligence processes.
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The Proliferation of Intelligence, Surveillance,
Target Acquisition, and Reconnaissance (ISTAR)
and Related Technologies
Less than 20 years ago, mobile phones were relatively uncommon, and few phones had integrated
cameras. Now, camera-equipped phones are ubiquitous, and there are massive networks of connected
users sharing images, videos, and text in near real time,
on a global scale. In addition, the automatic uploading of data from many connected devices, whether
intended to be public or private, provides unfiltered
access to this information for intelligence agencies
seeking to exploit it.28 This unregulated global network represents both a risk and an opportunity; it is
a risk to allied covert activities and operational security (OPSEC), and an opportunity for allies to gain
intelligence against certain threats, such as terrorists
or belligerent nations.29 The cost of entry to the global
information community is now negligible, and many
commercially available information systems could be
used directly in, or adapted to be part of, unmanned
covert ISTAR processes.30 In addition, the trend toward
miniaturization means the devices have become
smaller and hence harder to find even if not deliberately concealed. Improved battery technologies have
also resulted in more energy for a given size, meaning that there are increases in endurance and hence
the potential for greater standoff ranges.31 The use of
mobile phones as remote recording and transmission
devices is commonplace. Consequently, the U.S. Army
may find it harder to achieve surprise by maneuver if,
for example, photographs and videos of the U.S. Army
are being instantaneously propagated ahead of them
by covert or overt means.32
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As is the case with all armed services, the U.S.
Army will have been, and will continue to be, a target
of infiltration.33 Miniature cameras, transmitters, and
data storage and recording devices may increasingly
be used to pass large amounts of information in and
out of U.S. Army and other related sites without the
knowledge or control of security staff. Secret information that could enable terrorist acts may rapidly attract
a cash value, and it is likely that U.S. Army counterintelligence capabilities will be tested to the limit.34
Unrestricted Information Warfare (IW)
In tandem with the proliferation of networking
technologies, we might expect adversaries to suppress
competing stories, communications, and data by jamming transmissions, or hacking and bringing down
websites.35 One example is TV5Monde, a French television network, which was brought down by hackers
in April 2015 using seven points of entry believed to be
operating from Russia.36 Such attacks may be part of
a campaign by Russia to test and hone their technical
intelligence gathering techniques and cyber arsenal on
relatively easy targets.37 More highly developed cyber
weapons could threaten the effectiveness of the conventional media, mass communication, and friendly
military systems.
“Fake news,” the latest fashionable term for disinformation, has achieved a high profile recently on
many media channels. Projects and associated sites
such as Fact Check and The Integrity Initiative provide essential exposures of information manipulation.38 Using a combination of part truths, emphasis,
selective exclusion, and falsehoods, belligerent nations
and groups are able to use highly connected media
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and attention-grabbing actions to push their stories to
the top of the international agenda, using social media
to spread lies, dissent, and fear, and manipulating the
media and democratic processes.39 For example, the
Russian expansion into Ukraine and the annexation of
Crimea are supported by concerted IW activities in the
Baltic States. The Russian IW sequence was tested in
the Ukraine and has proven to be effective.40
Other recent examples of concerted campaigns of
disinformation/fake news in conjunction with cyber
effects include the U.S. Presidential election in 2016
and the French Presidential election in 2017. In the case
of the U.S. election, American intelligence agencies
have concluded with “high confidence” that Russia
acted covertly in the latter stages of the Presidential
campaign to promote Donald J. Trump.41 According to
James Comey, former Director of the Federal Bureau
of Investigation (FBI) and James Clapper, Director of
National Intelligence, Russia launched cyberattacks
on the election to denigrate Hillary Clinton.42 With
respect to the French 2017 election, a similar attack
occurred whereby internal campaign documents,
including emails and financial data, were taken in an
effort to undermine Presidential candidate Emmanuel Macron. Shortly before the polls closed, nine gigabytes of hacked documents were released online by an
anonymous user and disseminated with automated
bots. Although the source of the attacks has not been
publicly named by the French authorities, Russian
involvement is suspected partly due to support for the
opposing candidate Marine Le Pen, who supports a
pro-Moscow foreign policy, as well as recent evidence
of Russian involvement in targeting Macron’s campaign through the use of phishing emails, malware,
and fake domain names.43
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The Russian campaign to expand on its western
front is based on well-coordinated and structured IO,
and it carefully controls and influences both traditional
and social media.44 Russia is repeatedly implicated
in media manipulation and attempts at destabilization. In February 2016, Der Spiegel reported on how
Moscow achieves its strategic communications effects
through spreading numerous targeted lies in order to
achieve the “boy who cried wolf” effect. The simultaneous release of multiple false versions of an event
has the effect of blurring the lines between what is real
and what is fabricated. In other words, rather than to
attempt to beat its opponent in its battle for the truth,
Russia simply sabotages the whole game. According
to one European Union (EU) insider specialist interviewed by Der Speigel, “Russian propaganda does not
put out one version of a story but many, and in doing
so, it pollutes the realm of information. In the end,
people no longer believe any version—including the
one that’s true.”45
A further intention is to generate dissent and
anger.46 This is achieved partially through troll factories, where employees known as trolls write and post
blog entries or comments for news and other websites with the aim of agitating members of the Russian
opposition, or Western democracies in general such
as the EU and the United States. For example, on September 11, 2014, trolls triggered alarms in the United
States when hundreds of tweets reported an alleged
chemical accident in a Louisiana factory. The coordinated campaign of false information originated from
trolls based in St. Petersburg, Russia. However, the
main concern was that it was likely to have been a test
run for future, larger-scale disinformation campaigns
originating from Russia.47 The United Kingdom’s (UK)
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Telegraph also reports on the British Government’s
acknowledgement of the role and extent of Russian
IW activities.48 While some of the Russian IO appears
almost comical in the West, the tight control over their
own media ensures that the domestic Russian populace is regularly fed a conveniently pro-Putin information diet.49
While several nations and terrorist groups practice
their influence across all communications channels,
the protection and defense of military systems has not
been put to one side. Nations and groups will continue to camouflage their weapons, intelligence, and
communications system. For example, in the unclassified domain, rumors abound of North Korea’s underground facilities.50 Signature masking and signature
adaptation, for example, of vehicles, bunkers, missile
systems, and suicide bombers, could make it challenging to discriminate between real and decoy physical
targets in congested and noisy environments, even
with advanced sensors. In response, there are clear
indications from industry that a holistic approach to
information management should be adopted, and that
technology alone is not a universal solution.51
It must also be assumed that adversaries have competent counter-deception capabilities. There is a risk
that if the U.S. Army or its allies exploit simple deceptions, these actions may fail, and it will be easily outmaneuvered.52 Of course, we should not expect to see
much in the way of evidence of these failures, as adversaries will take all possible steps to make the United
States believe deceptions have been successful.53
It follows that the U.S. Army should be prepared to
field more robust and potentially complex deceptions
in support of its strategic objectives—enough to overmatch the adversary’s counter-deception capabilities.
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The U.S. Army can use combinations of deceptions
and other aggressive IO as force multipliers, reducing the adversary’s effectiveness and confidence.54
The exploitation of several mutually supporting IO
is generally more effective than the implementation
of elementary deceptions that are single-outcome
strategies.55
U.S. doctrine states, “the key to a Strategic Win is
to present the enemy with multiple dilemmas.”56 One
way to achieve this is to offer complex and multiple
deceptions to disrupt adversary planning and decision-
making. In order to reduce cost and increase the cognitive load on the adversary, some simple deceptions
can be launched in order to provide the appearance of
more complex deceptions, increasing uncertainty in
the adversary’s mind, and perhaps helping obscure
friendly intelligence actions.57
The U.S. Army and its adversaries will both try to
make planning and decision-making more difficult for
each other, exacerbating the challenges that complexity and deception can bring. Each operation launched
by an actor is likely to affect several different parts of
the target complex system and other connected complex systems. The planners and decision-makers who
are adept at understanding the networked nature of
targets will be able to make better decisions than those
who assume independence between objects in the
information and physical environments. Recognizing
connectedness and complexity should be a routine
activity for the analyst and the planner.58
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Risks
Primary Command and Control (C2) Risks
The U.S. Army’s C2 systems are likely to be one of
the adversaries’ priority targets.59 We suggest some
examples of risks that illustrate potential activities and
outcomes, as follows:
• The operational level C2 structure might be
targeted, with a large number of cyberattacks
attempting to remove, alter, and insert commands, for example, by subverting error-checking codes.60
• The U.S. Army Operating Concept observes,
“Information systems connect the strategic
sustainment base to tactical organizations to
anticipate needs and provide a high degree of
responsiveness and reliability in the supply
chain.”61
• This makes information technology in the supply
chain a primary target for adversaries, both in
peacetime and in conflict. The risk is that the
hardware and software within U.S. Army C2 systems could be degraded and manipulated.62
• The tempo of IW may increase to the point where
the mean time between significant events is
shorter than the time needed to generate rational
decisions or resolve ambiguities. This will affect
the U.S. Army, its allies, and its adversaries.
• The tempo of events, conflict, communications,
and distractions might rise and fall unpredictably, placing difficult demands on the resourcing
process.

15

• Adversaries may have mature deception strategies that are tested and versatile, and focused on
U.S. Army assets and processes.
• Adversaries could corrupt, jam, and spoof U.S.
Army tactical communications and insert messages and sounds that are intended to mislead,
distract, and confuse Soldiers.63
• Adversaries might cause global positioning
system blackouts, whiteouts, and noise, and they
might try covertly to manipulate systems, perhaps by inserting false targets.
• Cyberattacks could increase uncertainty in command and intelligence systems, and adversaries
could seek to reduce uncertainty falsely by reinforcing belief where there should be doubt.
• Adversaries might use swarm techniques in
order to overwhelm U.S. Army intelligence systems and to clutter the operating picture.
Primary Defense Intelligence Risks
• There may be multiple targets and adversaries
in the physical and informational environments,
requiring more information than can be attained
or understood in the time available.
• The intelligence analysis might fail to recognize
unfamiliar threats, for example, if they are buried
in bulk data.
• Adversary counterintelligence systems might
prevent us from gaining the intelligence required
to prosecute threats or defend our assets.
• Some threats might behave in an apparently irrational fashion, making it difficult for analysts to
predict their behavior.

16

• Emerging technologies might provide incremental or game-changing advantages for adversaries.
• Adversaries and belligerents may feign actions,
vulnerabilities, and provide false feedback in
order to divert and manipulate allied intelligence
activities.
• Intelligence systems could experience multiple
cyberattacks simultaneously.
• Adversaries may feed bulk information to clog
the intelligence channels and process.
• The adversary could use convincing physical
camouflage and dummy systems that will challenge friendly detection and counter-deception
methods. Given the proliferation of high technology sensors throughout the battlespace, and
indeed land, sea, air, and space as a whole, the
contest to spoof and conceal will escalate with
complex deceptions. This introduces the concept
of “signature warfare” and emphasizes the need
for the U.S. Army to adopt and excel in this area.
Primary Information Warfare (IW) Risks
• Adversaries may feed credible false information
into intelligence systems and processes in order
to lead the U.S. Army to construct the wrong
hypotheses, and to manipulate decision-making
to the adversary’s advantage.64
• Adversaries may have extensive intelligence and
counterintelligence networks that are not constrained by any laws or any ethics, and that are
unpredictable, meaning that the U.S. Army is
outmaneuvered.
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• Some adversary intelligence services are wellprepared, well-funded, and well-organized. It
is sensible to assume that they will already have
started their own advanced covert operations
in several areas of potential conflict or competition.65
• U.S. Army supply chains may be targeted. The
adversary may attack databases and, for example, may alter schedules in order to prevent the
effective supply of munitions, food and water,
spares, fuel, and medical goods.
• Uplink and downlink communications for
drones might be jammed, spoofed, or manipulated by the adversary’s cyber specialists to remove
or insert items.66
• Adversaries may exploit their own highly protected special capabilities, including technologies and IO.
• Adversaries may engineer events to make it
appear that third parties are involved in actions
that they are not.
Summary
The U.S. Army is an attractive target for adversary
commanders and fighters. It could experience diverse
forms of attack, varying in scale, sophistication, and
tempo. Its adversaries might range from nations practicing conventional and specialized warfare to small
groups exploiting irregular forms of warfare. There
are many risks to its C2 operations, and to its intelligence and IW capabilities. The challenges include: significant uncertainty; sudden unexpected events; high
noise and clutter levels in intelligence pictures; basic
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and complex deceptions through a variety of channels;
the actions of hidden actors; and novel forms of attack
on U.S. and allied command, control, communications,
computers, information/intelligence, surveillance,
targeting acquisition, and reconnaissance (C4ISTAR)
systems.
The U.S. Army needs to maintain information dominance in all environments, but in order to achieve this,
it must exploit the complexity and uncertainty in the
battlespace and not simply seek to overcome it. While
determination and commitment are necessary, they are
not sufficient—to achieve and maintain information
dominance, the U.S. Army will also require: a significant injection of innovation; a robust and resilient C2
and intelligence capability; novel technologies; and an
accelerated IO capability development program that is
broad, deep, sustained, and well-coordinated. The U.S.
Army’s prowess in conventional warfighting should
be augmented by the exploitation of advanced special operations in the technological and informational
domains, expertly and rapidly integrated, using tested
multiple outcome strategies that will survive and succeed in uncertain and very aggressive circumstances.
PART 2: INTEGRATION
To win in a complex world, Army forces must provide
the Joint Force with multiple options, integrate the efforts
of multiple partners, operate across multiple domains,
and present our enemies and adversaries with multiple
dilemmas.67

The U.S. Army is committed to a high state of resilience and readiness. The problem is that for complex
environments, the U.S. Army cannot afford simply
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to be very effective in a known set of circumstances
and unprepared for others, and neither can it afford
to be only moderately capable in the broadest possible
range of circumstances. The U.S. Army has to be very
effective across the board, in all phases. This means
the U.S. Army must prepare a significant portfolio
of IO material, procedures, and responses for use in
information contests, and be well-trained in the rapid
selection and integration of IRCs. The volume of material in this portfolio, and the potential combinations
and sequences of operations, will place extraordinary
demands on the integration staff and the integration
process itself.
Structurally, the U.S. Army is central to joint operations. The U.S. Army provides multiple options in support of the Joint Force Commander’s (JFC) objectives.
Joint operations are critical to cope with such complexity,
and the Army’s contribution must provide unique
capabilities and multiple options to the President,
Secretary of Defense, and Combatant Commanders.68

The Joint Information Operations Warfare Center
ensures the integration of all IRCs in support of IO,
and at the international and coalition level, coordination is undertaken by Joint Staff.69 This means that the
integrated operations work together symbiotically to
achieve the desired effect, enabling force multiplication and an effects-based approach.
IRCs can be capabilities, techniques, or activities, but
they do not necessarily have to be technology-based.
Additionally, it is important to focus on the fact that IRCs
may come from a wide variety of sources. Therefore, in IO,
it is not the ownership of the capabilities and techniques
that is important, but rather their integrated application
in order to achieve a JFC’s end state.70
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One of the key benefits of integration is that it supports deconfliction. This ensures, for example, that
messages to a target audience do not contradict each
other, and that actions do not contradict messages.
It can also reduce uncertainty by helping the right
information flow through a complex organization.71
It should be noted, however, that as previously highlighted, contradictory messaging is not a constraint for
adversaries. In fact, conflicting messages can be used
as a means of introducing confusion so that neither
true nor false messages are believable to the audience.
Integration also plays a vital role in the intelligence function. Not only does it bring together the
collection, analysis, and dissemination processes, but
also it enables other operations to protect the intelligence capabilities and activities (for example, by misdirection, camouflage, deception, and distraction) and
sometimes to enhance the intelligence process by stimulating the target to provide the information that we
seek.72 The expert coordination and synchronization of
operations may simultaneously provide intelligence
and deterrence via a number of channels, such as cyber,
diplomatic, psychological operations, and deception.
This can provide a strong basis for subsequent operations by de-risking specific courses of action and
allowing more options for the commander to take later
in the engagement.73 This matters to the U.S. Army
because it permits the commander to adapt his C2 and
his intelligence activities to unfolding circumstances.
Integration enables several activities to be effective, including IO, military information support operations, intelligence, and strategic communications. All
of these activities support the objectives of the commander by influencing many targets, including by
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educating and informing populations and disrupting
and exposing adversaries.74
Integrating multiple actions in a complex environment is a demanding and highly labor-intensive activity. The integration exercise is exacerbated by the fact
that staff do not know beforehand how many or which
adversaries they will need to neutralize, and they often
cannot know exactly where there will be conflicts, how
events may unfold, and which will be the commander’s highest priority options or courses of actions.75 We
have seen how adversaries might attempt to corrupt
the intelligence and integration functions by providing
misinformation and noise; this makes integration even
more of a challenge.
Although the U.S. Army and Joint Forces undertake
extensive and rigorous training across multiple stakeholders, simulating a variety of scenarios and events,
it remains likely that many capabilities will have to be
integrated rapidly in unfamiliar, fast-changing, and
potentially deceptive conditions. In order to retain
agility and speed, a commander may decentralize
some assets and permit them to operate within a specific operational envelope.76 Such actions allow highlevel integration, while delegating risk management
to the appropriate level and giving latitude to make
tactical and operational decisions quickly.
In a complex engagement, it is likely that multiple
kinetic and IO must be seamlessly integrated. At the
same time, the adversary may exploit multiple linked
operations, targeting several actors in the contested
space. The U.S. Army’s IRCs must be able to address
the challenges of the data deluge, the proliferation of
ISTAR systems and hostile information manipulation, as well as other significant risks. This presents
the U.S. Army with the simultaneous challenges of the
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complexity of the environment and the rapid tempo of
events.
The concept of overmatching applies not just to
warfighting, but also to complex systems. For one
system to dominate another, it must control that system
(in the academic literature, a system is often said to be
“regulating” rather than “controlling” another). In our
context, we wish to control not just the adversary, but
also the information environment, and hence the perceptions of the adversary and indeed neutral actors,
who may have been deceived and influenced by the
adversary.
Insight into the control of a complex system is
gained by referring to Ashby’s Law of Requisite Variety.77 This “law” asserts that, in order to control a complex system, the controlling mechanism needs to have
at least the same variety/complexity as the object to
be controlled. The “controlling mechanism” is the U.S.
Army and its allies. The “system” is the adversary and
the environment. The “tasks” are the operations and
actions that the U.S. Army undertakes; integration is
the coordination of these tasks. This is articulated well
by Ken Thomson, a consultant in team development:
The law tells us that a ‘system’ only has ‘requisite variety’
if its repertoire of responses is at least as big as the number
of different stimuli it may encounter in its environment.
A system without requisite variety will fail whenever it
encounters the unexpected and as such is not a ‘viable
system’.78

Put in these terms, for the U.S. Army to control a
complex system that includes adversaries and a complex environment, it needs a greater variety of operations than the adversary, and enough options to
account for any major eventuality that may arise in the

23

environment. This is an intuitive step, which implies
a move away from reliance on intensity, namely conducting operations simply with more energy or speed,
and instead toward an understanding of the requirement for several linked and mutually supporting activities that envelop the environment, and how to enable
them. For example, inexperienced or naïve planners
may treat a cyber threat as a purely technical problem,
and this tends to elicit a technical response. In reality,
the humans behind the technical threat may be launching other attacks in parallel.79 An inability to grasp the
actual complexity of an attack will lead to failure. This
introduces the risk of the target being predictable and
easily drawn into a series of pointless technical diversions while the real damage is being done elsewhere.80
When confronted with a task, adversary, or environment more complicated than one can currently
manage, there are two options:
1. Increase the variety in the regulator (also known
as amplification).
2. Reduce the variety in the system being regulated (also known as attenuation).
In fact, the U.S. Army could choose both options,
and increase its available set of IO (“amplifying” the
available variety), while using warfighting methods
to “attenuate” the target. This could be by attrition—
reducing the connectivity of the system and the available options for the adversary commander. This is a
method of dealing with the complexity of the environment, as well as with the adversary. Examples of how
to increase the variety of operations are provided later.
In order to address the challenge of high-tempo
operations, the burden on the integration staff and the
commander must be reduced as much as possible so
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that they are able to make faster and better decisions. In
addition to the provision of tools to address complexity, we can prepare the Force by analyzing operations
and their use, risks, dependencies on other operations
or circumstances, support they can offer to courses
of action, and likely outcomes and potential scenarios. This preparation of operations and corresponding analyses is likely to present the integration staff
with more combinations of operations, allowing them
to select from a wider portfolio of actions and capabilities, and benefiting from a head start based on the
early analysis. With this variety, the commander can
overmatch the adversary and control the environment.
The task of integrating operations, synchronizing
and coordinating from the tactical up to the strategic
level, across all phases of warfare is immense, and
integration is the fulcrum. If there is an inadequate
variety of tools for the commander, or the integration
is ineffective, the U.S. Army will struggle to achieve
parity with an unconstrained adversary. With innovation, preparation, and robust integration, the U.S.
Army can achieve information supremacy. Integration
is the means by which the IO, and all other operations,
work together to achieve the control that is required
for information dominance.
PART 3: SOLUTIONS
Because of the variety of risks and opportunities
in a complex environment, no single action or venture will sustain information dominance. In order to
achieve and maintain dominance, the commander
must have access to a wide variety of innovative IO
that can be seamlessly integrated with the Joint Plan,
be confident that his C2 and intelligence systems are
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resilient to attack and subversion, and rely on welltrained staff. This, coupled with the use or threat of
overwhelming force, is a good start.
In this section, some potential solutions are outlined by revisiting the headline challenges.
Data Deluge
The data deluge is both a risk and an opportunity
for the U.S. Army and for its adversaries. To achieve
dominance, the U.S. Army must make the most of the
opportunities presented by having access to massive
amounts of data, while ensuring that the adversary
cannot operate effectively, for example, by making it
also difficult for the adversary to select relevant data
from the bulk. Similarly, the adversary may seek to
achieve advantage by overloading the U.S. Army’s
intelligence and C2 functions.
Therefore, the U.S. Army needs to exploit advances
in data management, selection, pattern matching, and
hypothesis generation by working with academia and
industry, as well as continuing to share concepts and
research, for example, through existing international
technical cooperation programs with partner nations.81
The application of advanced hardware and software
to massive data problems should be complemented by
investing in intelligence analysis by humans; one route
is to provide a sustained and advantageous career path
for promising individuals, ensuring the profession is
recognized as applicable to many real world opportunities within the defense, intelligence, and security
communities and in wider business.
One of the components of intelligence analysis that should be developed further is counterdeception. Deception and other forms of manipulation
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may be used by the adversary and the U.S. Army in
many ways. For example, they may provide false but
attractive information in bulk data, provide overwhelming ambiguity, divert the adversary’s intelligence collection efforts, and reduce an adversary’s
confidence in the truth. They may even increase the
adversary’s confidence in falsehoods, and even appear
to undertake these manipulations when, in fact, there
is no actual operation (this is explored later in the topic
“sublime operations”). The intelligence expert has to
account for very many possibilities, including deception, without spending all his or her time on imaginary
threats and tactics. He or she is simultaneously under
pressure to produce intelligence summaries rapidly,
without the time fully to resolve, analyze, or discard
all potential hypotheses. It is a complex task, and participation is worthy of investment and recognition.
Given that all actors experience the same problems
of bulk data, ambiguity, and the potential of deception and forms of information sabotage, the U.S. Army
should take every opportunity to exacerbate the adversary’s intelligence challenges. In addition to developing and recognizing the contribution of intelligence
staff, the U.S. Army should field a strong tactical and
operational level active counterintelligence capability
that deliberately targets adversary intelligence functions and undertakes various activities to mislead and
degrade them. It is vital that there is proper coordination between allied intelligence staff and allied counterintelligence staff; otherwise, there is a risk that they
will inadvertently work against each other. This essential integration activity will extend to synchronizing
kinetic operations, and the use of physical deception
measures to support aggressive counterintelligence
ventures. There is common ground between military
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deception and active counterintelligence activities, and
staff must work together for a common purpose when
there is shared responsibility for an action. Clearly,
the integration cell has a pivotal role in these activities at every stage, including cueing intelligence assets
to verify outcomes, coordinating decoy activities, and
preparing to deploy counterintelligence actions.
Proliferation of ISTAR and Related Technologies
The information environment may contain multiple ISTAR systems operated or exploited by adversaries, and indeed many surveillance systems that supply
legitimate media organizations. In order to control the
information environment, the U.S. Army may choose
to destroy threat information systems, exploit them,
or ignore them. Some destructive systems can operate
over a wide area and can be used to “sweep” threat
sensors without each one having to be isolated separately. Electronic warfare can be used to jam a network
of sensors, destroy the systems themselves, or exploit
them to spoof the adversary. Technologies in the field
are advancing, and the need to coordinate many capabilities is critical. The U.S. Army has developed tools to
control and enhance electronic warfare capabilities.82
The U.S. Army may also decide to exploit the adversary’s ISTAR systems (and neutral information systems, such as media and reporting agencies), feeding
in suitable data in order to manipulate the perceptions
and hence decision
-making functions of the adversary commander. This action requires coordination.
Special Forces, for example, might be tasked to identify and manipulate several ISTAR systems in a contested area to distract the adversary’s intelligence staff
from other operations undertaken by the U.S. Army
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nearby. Special Forces might encourage the adversary to believe that there is a distraction underway
in order to increase their level of confusion—another
example of a sublime operation. Repeated manipulations of sensors can be used as a conditioning activity
to permit a real operation to be launched at a time and
place of the U.S. Army’s choice. While it may be hard
initially to gauge the effect of such operations, if they
are well-integrated, they can be used to help protect
intelligence gathering, confuse the adversary’s defensive measures, encourage the adversary to employ
the wrong weapons, monitor the wrong locations and
communications, and use inappropriate tactics in an
engagement. U.S. Army Soldiers should be encouraged to understand the value of aggressive IO so that
they can play an active part when they are tasked. This
awareness, coupled with rigorous counter-deception
analyses and innovative disruptive capabilities, will
support the U.S. Army’s imperative to achieve information supremacy.
Adversary Information Warfare (IW) and Kinetic
Attack
The U.S. Army and its adversaries face the challenges of complexity, uncertainty, and time pressure.
Some adversaries will be patient and clever, and others
will be impetuous and irrational. There is no one defensive measure that will protect the U.S. Army’s C2 and
Soldiers from attack. However, as with the conceptual
solutions for data and ISTAR systems, a coordinated
defense offers an effective basis for a powerful offense.
The U.S. Army should have reliable counterdeception capabilities that overmatch the adversary’s
deceptions. This will require rigorous training, competitions, exercises, and research into potential deceptive
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methods used in modern warfare. Counter-deception
staff will require substantial patience as well as excellent analytic skills. These staff will need to work with
the planning cell to develop and implement means to
outmaneuver the adversary. It is no longer a reasonable strategy to insist on there being clear evidence
of a deception’s existence before acting to counter the
potential implications of a putative deception. Any
competent adversary will mask the evidence of that
deception and probably fabricate evidence to show
that the deception does not exist.83 The important
principle that “absence of evidence is not evidence of
absence” holds well here.84
Counter-deception staff are well-positioned to cue
intelligence activities to help uncover deceptions, and
to develop deceptions themselves. Any deception considered by U.S. Army staff must be passed through the
U.S. Army’s integration staff, as they will be aware of
any other operations being undertaken (this is especially important with covert operations, where very
few people have a need to know). The integration staff
will be able to take the appropriate steps to ensure
there is force multiplication, while minimizing the risk
to friendly forces and staff.
In order to combat and neutralize adversary IW
activities, the planner, deception, counter-deception,
and intelligence staff must work together to ensure
that they can control the responses of the adversary to the actions that the commander takes. The
commander should be briefed on the sophistication
of the adversary’s operations, so that he or she can
understand how to use resources to overmatch them
with minimum wastage. In a complex and deceptive
environment, we may never know if we have overestimated the adversary (and have expended far too
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many resources defeating them), or whether we have
accurately assessed their degree of sophistication (and
have achieved success economically). It is only when
an adversary outmaneuvers us, because we underestimated them, that the extent of any error on our part
may become clear. By then, it is too late. This matters
to the U.S. Army because it cannot afford constantly
to proceed too cautiously, perceiving potential threats
where there are none and deploying complex operations that massively overmatch an adversary. There is
no analytic or technological solution to this, but experience and intelligence provide the insight that allows a
commander to select the appropriate course of action.
The adversary will attack U.S. Army information
systems using kinetic methods as well as deception,
including potentially advanced technical sabotage. To
achieve resilience under these conditions, C2 systems
must exhibit graceful degradation (the ability to continue to function when degraded or damaged). The
U.S. Army’s technical defenses such as firewalls, operating procedures, and other OPSEC activities can be
augmented by deploying sacrificial systems. If the U.S.
Army deploys decoy C2 systems that can be detected
by the adversary, then these are likely to attract the
adversary’s attention. They can be configured to provide the feedback the adversary will seek. For example, a combination of effects such as lights going off,
radio silence, or changes in communications content.
This will lead the adversary to believe that the U.S.
Army’s C2 function has been successfully disrupted,
when in fact it has not. It is possible to deploy several
of these sacrificial decoys in order to waste the adversary’s time and gain intelligence on their methods and
capabilities.
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The adversary will manage, at some point, to
degrade the U.S. Army’s C2 and information systems.85
The U.S. Army should continue to prepare for this by
training for operations without access to friendly systems such as communications facilities or navigation
equipment. It is possible that veteran staff will be able
to describe situations and workarounds.
Training under these conditions will help Soldiers
learn to survive complex attacks and will expose major
vulnerabilities, allowing them to be strengthened. The
exercises can then be repeated, testing the new defenses
and new ways of working. These exercises could be
designed and observed by selected experts from academia and industry.86 Training under conditions of
limited functionality is a valuable risk reduction activity and will refresh training regimes, challenging the
trainers as well as the trainees. For example, one such
competition could be arranged by having two units
attempt to secure a position, where one unit has no
navigation systems and the other has no communications systems. While the communications systems
might prove more valuable in this engagement, it
would be interesting to see how each unit developed
workarounds. Each unit would want to increase their
performance, and would inevitably try to develop
strategies that make their opponents fail. In addition
to the loss of some information systems, other forms
of degradation, such as gaps in information traffic,
would probably be experienced in conflict.
The adversary’s attacks on the U.S. Army’s decoy
systems can be used as a weapon against them. A
well-coordinated deception that indicates to the adversary that there is a failure of C2 can lure the adversary into a false sense of security and a false sense of
advantage. At an appropriate moment, the U.S. Army
commander may choose to reveal to the adversary that
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the systems that were under attack are fully functioning—this might have just the demoralizing effect that
is required. It will also reduce the adversary’s confidence in its other forms of attack. This provides a benefit to the U.S. Army because it attacks the adversary’s
will to fight. A terrorist leader, for example, who realizes he has been attacking a patient, clever, and almost
invulnerable target will be more susceptible to other of
the U.S. Army’s influences, as he will feel and appear
impotent and foolish.
The U.S. Army can also take steps to control the
tempo of the information contest, and perhaps therefore the physical conflict. By providing false intelligence to an adversary at an increasing rate, the U.S.
Army can examine the response of the adversary,
exhaust the adversary’s intelligence resources and
the condition of its staff, induce fatigue, and reduce
the adversary’s ability to concentrate. The U.S. Army
can also choose to indicate a slowing down of events,
when in fact it may be preparing for a rapid assault. To
control the adversary’s perceptions, overt and covert
channels can be used, providing an overwhelmingly
compelling narrative to the adversary. This applies to
situations where we want the adversary to believe a
particular idea, or when we choose to make him uncertain. The coordination of physical operations and IO is
vital to achieving success.
Preparation
The prerequisite for undertaking such special IO
is that the operational concepts are available at the
point of need, and that they have been risk analyzed,
described in depth, and subjected to tests and exercises where possible, so that the commander can be
confident in their use. It remains for the integration
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staff to position the operations properly; in sequence;
updated and tuned to account for the latest and best
intelligence; and arranged to exploit resources, the
information environment, and the known or suspected
susceptibilities and biases of the target.
Special Information Operations (SIO)
This monograph has referenced several opportunities for deception and active counterintelligence. These
operations, and other sensitive, covert, or unusual specialist operations, are often identified as special information operations (SIO). SIO, used in concert with
other special capabilities (including special technical
operations, [STO]), can be valuable enablers and protection mechanisms for conventional operations.
The U.S. Army’s use of SIO is an important component of its future asymmetric warfare capability. In
addition to excellence in warfighting, the U.S. Army
needs to be able to field a wide variety of IO to secure
the advantage, and grow and exploit confusion in the
adversary’s mind. This is achieved by diverting, confusing, demoralizing, or disrupting the adversary’s
perceptions, decision-making ability, and their plans.
This is important because it means that the risk to U.S.
Soldiers can be reduced, and the Soldiers can achieve
more if their adversaries are uninformed or misled.
Proficient use of SIO will create cumulative effects,
where each operation magnifies the effect of those
already undertaken, and prepares the ground for subsequent operations. SIO are particularly useful when
the commander wishes to put the adversary on the
back foot, and, as such, they are one of the principal
means by which the U.S. Army can achieve and maintain information dominance.
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Again, this underlines the vital importance of the
integration cell—they have to coordinate SIO, mainstream IO, and conventional warfighting measures in
order to achieve protection of their Soldiers, as they
advance into uncertain territories.
The Operational Collection—an Information
Operations (IO) Playbook
It has been noted that the U.S. Army commander
will benefit from being able to select IO, including SIO,
from a collection (or playbook). The chosen operations
could then be modified to fit the prevailing circumstances, the characteristics of the environment, the
target, and the (Joint) plan though the usual integration process.
The provision of such a collection will require concentrated innovation, analysis, competitive exercises,
and rigorous selection procedures, driven by experienced military staff and subject matter experts, and
supplied by a diverse community from academia,
industry, and a range of social backgrounds. Once
prepared, the collection of operations could provide
significantly more options for the commander than
available at present. This is relevant because without
a collection of pre-analyzed operations to consult, the
commander will have the choice of either developing
and analyzing IO from scratch or proceeding without
the options altogether and relying solely on kinetic
capabilities—perhaps placing Soldiers at risk and
reducing potential options later in the engagement.
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Information Operations (IO) Playbook—Preparation
The preparation of such a playbook would be
labor-intensive. Ideally, this work should be undertaken in times of relative peace to permit reflection,
and uninterrupted and concentrated study by relevant
staff and communities. Working in peacetime is not
just easier, it reduces the work that has to be undertaken at the time of conflict when resources tend to be
scarcer. This matters to the U.S. Army because during
times of conflict it will free the commander and his or
her staff to concentrate exclusively on the actions and
orders that must be addressed at that time.
The preparatory stage can be undertaken in a cyclic
fashion, starting with work that requires innovation.
A model for undertaking this capability development could include the formation of several working
groups, as follows:
1. Innovation Group—this should be drawn from
a wide range of academic and industrial backgrounds, allowing technologists, inventors, designers, entrepreneurs, social scientists, historians, cultural experts, psychologists, and others
to contribute. This group should be tasked to
consider what operations could be used to overcome certain problems, counter hostile operations, or provide certain effects.
2. Scenario Staff—innovators from the Innovation
Group will require context that helps them understand the problem, such as adversary actions,
target information (including, for example, populations, neutral actors, and adversaries), and
realistic examples of congested and highly contested information environments. These target
and environment descriptions will provide use-
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ful opportunities and constraints, and experienced IO staff can ensure the ideas and analyses
are realistic and focused, using a series of “what
if” scenarios in competitions between operational concepts, played out in a series of organized
contests. Scenario staff could supply all this contextual information.
3. Red Team—this team should realistically reflect
the methods and practice of nations and terrorist
groups. The team could undertake research that
shows what activities, tactics, and technologies
may be used against the U.S. Army. Some adversaries may be very clever, well-funded, unconstrained by ethical and legal constraints, and
with special capabilities of their own. Other adversaries may be unpredictable, irrational, and
impetuous. The formation of this team provides
another opportunity to exploit contributions
from a wide community. The U.S. Army can
also bring in staff from, for example, the Central Intelligence Agency and the National Security Agency to ensure breadth and depth and to
invite a comprehensive challenge to the nascent
operations.
4. Analysis Group—this should record, analyze,
and compare activities, effects, risks, and opportunities during the research and competition
stages, and then collate and summarize this
material. The risk analysis may constitute the
bulk of the preparatory work. It will require
experience, insight, and a thorough assembly of
relevant risks, indexed so that innovators and
military staff can interrogate the database and
understand what risks are contained or introduced, what effects can be achieved, and what
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methods there are to protect or enhance other
influence activities. This enables rapid and effective integration at the point of use. The analysis will explore potential sequences, measures
of effectiveness, effects, potential failure modes,
and second order effects. Some operations will
work well together and will provide mutual
protection, such as, some intelligence and some
distraction actions. Others may conflict, such
as destroying adversary communications infrastructure, and inserting false information into
their C2 operating picture. The preparation
will identify coordination and synchronization
issues for the operations, and for groups and
sequences of operations.
At the first iteration, these groups collectively could
generate, analyze, and select the initial collection of
operations. For the subsequent iterations, the initial
collection of operations could be developed during
further competitions, as well as through analysis and
particularly from use during conflict. The Analysis
Group can refresh the concepts and pass the enhanced
operations back to the Innovation Group, with a challenge to improve them, or indeed to counter them. The
Innovation Group’s countering of these operations
will supply the Red Team with material to use, and the
Innovation Group can then be challenged to counter
them in turn. This design spiral will allow variations
on many basic operations to be explored and subsequently exploited. In particular, the best material can
be added to the playbook and offered to military judgment panels for exploitation by the U.S. Army. In this
way, the U.S. Army can explore ways that its adversaries might work against it, and synchronization and

38

coordination issues can be recorded to allow rapid and
effective integration in times of conflict.
The series of structured challenges would test
ideas and assumptions, and pit teams with different
approaches against each other, providing a safe environment to explore new techniques against deceptive
opponents, and opponents with unknown perspectives. The competitive nature of the exercises is key to
success. It is essential that these competitions are monitored to see what strategies are effective and for how
long. This will present valuable training material for
intelligence and the integration staff.
Experienced military staff (including veterans),
and civilian subject matter experts can observe and
influence the innovations, analyses, and competitions, helping prioritize and select the most promising concepts for inclusion in the overall collection. It
is important that the commander, at some point in the
future, knows that the ideas have been judged militarily viable by suitable staff.
Examples of Special Information Operations (SIO)
The examples of SIO given here and many others
can be developed in support of other warfighting
operations in order to reduce risk and provide options.
They do not generally replace any existing activities or
capabilities but provide ways to exploit the complexity
and uncertainties in the information environment by
being deployed alongside other operations, enhancing
their effect, and providing protection and diversion.
• Perturbation—the U.S. Army can undertake
operations that perturb or stimulate a target
so that it reacts in a way that supports the
U.S. Army’s intelligence activities, including
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detecting the presence of the adversary’s clandestine assets. Perturbation can be used as part
of a wider endeavor to degrade adversary intelligence agencies and exhaust their intelligence
channels.
• Signature Warfare—the U.S. Army will often be
the first forces on the ground and will advance
through urban and open landscapes at a relatively fast pace. It follows that the U.S. Army
should have expertise in controlling the visual,
electromagnetic, and other signatures given off
by their vehicles, Soldiers, communications systems, electronic warfare (EW) platforms, special
capabilities, and decoys. The U.S. Army should
be able to forward-deploy jamming devices,
false targets, false capabilities, and programmable signature generators in order to defeat
the adversary’s defense, target acquisition, and
maneuver strategies. This coordinated activity
might be termed “signature warfare.” It is an
area in which the U.S. Army can take the lead.
It is related to military deception and to active
counterintelligence and can support the OPSEC
objectives.
• Emergency Intervention—these are interventions that can cause delays, buy time, disrupt
high-impact threats, divert, or otherwise disrupt. They include actions such as dazzling,
swamping, overwhelming, or simply confusing
adversary intelligence functions that threaten
to achieve high-value intelligence against us.
They can be used, for example, to reduce a highimpact risk to a medium-impact risk.
• Conditioning—these activities consist of
repeated actions or events that may initially be
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of interest to the adversary, but appear after time
to become less interesting and more usual. They
can be used to make the first stage of an attack
appear relatively non-threatening by repeating
it and encouraging the adversary to associate it
with benign circumstances. False conditioning
leads the adversary to think you are conditioning them and keeping them alert. This can be
used as a decoy or a sublime operation.
• Intelligence Protection—intelligence activities
and signatures can be protected by providing
false evidence of movement, infiltration, and the
manipulation of adversary communications to
indicate that one of their systems is being compromised, in order to draw their attention away
from a genuine intelligence operation. Such operations must be fully integrated, as there is a risk
that they may inadvertently expose other intelligence activities. Protection can take the form
of conditioning, whereby a target is repeatedly
shown some information or a series of events, so
that they cease to take any strong interest. Protection requires planning and is effective when
coordinated with other SIO.
• Open Operation—this category describes activities that use information items that can be
deployed at an early stage and used later to
reinforce, support, develop, counter, or adapt
the narrative of our choosing. At the time of
deployment, its purpose or intended outcome is
not defined, but such operations can be adapted
later by being coupled or associated with
another activity, providing a means by which
the emerging requirements of the commander
can be achieved. An example is to fly a drone
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over an enemy position. At this time, there is
no particular purpose other than to prepare for
a requirement that may emerge later. Should a
requirement arise, the intelligence staff could,
for example, purposefully permit adversary
intelligence staff to intercept a message, indicating that the drone has gained some valuable
target data such as the position of adversary
tanks. This could be used to provide cover for
allied human intelligence (HUMINT) sources,
who would have supplied the real intelligence
about the tanks to the U.S. intelligence staff, and
the HUMINT sources would have been at risk
of exposure had the tanks been targeted without
another plausible explanation being available to
the adversary’s security and counterintelligence
staff. While this may appear somewhat convoluted, these actions are realistic and viable for
the U.S. Army but supremely difficult for the
adversary to identify and counter.
• Sublime Operations—this type of operation consists only of the appearance of an operation. Sublime operations can be exploited on their own
in order to disrupt normal processes, or concurrently with other more complex operations,
acting as a force multiplier or supporting activity. They are generally low cost and low risk,
and are useful when the commander wishes to
increase uncertainty in the adversary’s mind.
• Bulk Feed—this activity may be used to disable
an adversary intelligence channel by providing
a large amount of information that looks promising, but is generally useless. The process may
or may not be covert, and could be used as a
diversion or to mask another activity.
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• False Capabilities—this function can be
exploited to disrupt, demoralize, or divert targets; or to act as decoys or distractions. False
capabilities may be used in conjunction with
other confusing or compelling actions to provide
protection, as they can be used to draw attention
away from sensitive (real) capabilities. Alternatively, this can be exploited simply because it
is disruptive. False capabilities align well with
open operations and sublime operations.
• Active Counterintelligence—this is the deliberate process of manipulating a target intelligence
system to meet military objectives. It may be
used in all phases. Active counterintelligence
can exploit a variety of simultaneous operations
to support friendly intelligence operations, military deception, counter-deception operations,
and non-military functions such as diplomatic
and economic enterprises. It is very effective
against both terrorist groups and nation states.
A well-designed operation uses the characteristics of the target against it. It can, for example,
provide the information that the target seeks,
or that will reduce the target’s confidence in
genuine intelligence. The operations can be run
concurrently or serially, and with mutual consolidation, meaning that every bit of information
that is passed to the target intelligence channel
reinforces the hypothesis we wish the target to
have, or reinforces the uncertainty in their own
staff, channels, human intelligence and technical
intelligence. Active counterintelligence works
well with other SIO, and can be a vital part of
force protection, for example, by helping confirm in the enemy leader’s mind an idea that the
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U.S. Army would like him to have, or indeed to
disincline him from believing an idea that we do
not want him to believe.
SIO Summary
These examples represent some of the many types
of available SIO and variations to these can be developed, analyzed, and recorded. If the analysis is adequately rigorous, then the operations’ designs can be
made available as specific planning options, for example, to divert a threat, to contain a risk, to delay the
onset of an event, or to mask another activity. There
are several operational designs that simply reduce the
effectiveness of hostile intelligence activities, and have
no other effect. Although it might be hard directly to
measure the effect of these degrading operations, there
is low cost and risk to the U.S. Army, so they should
be considered. The development of a comprehensive
set of innovative and thoroughly analyzed procedures
will support the U.S. Army’s commitment to readiness.
Organizational Measures
Much of the investment required to achieve the
capabilities outlined in this monograph involves training and preparation of material using resources from
the wider domestic and international community.87
Doctrine
Existing doctrine includes comprehensive guidance on the planning and implementation of IO, psychological operations, and special operations. There
may be an opportunity to emphasize the value of
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using a variety of SIO in the intelligence preparation
of the battlefield (IPB) activities, in order to reduce the
adversary’s IPB activities.
Organization
At the organizational level, existing IO staff may
need to be augmented to include some new posts.
There will be additional educational demands, and
there may be a need to work very closely with a variety of civilians in order to produce the innovations
required for information dominance. There will be a
need for mentoring to help develop specialisms, and
it is recommended that IO specialists have clearly
defined career paths to ensure that the staff and the
U.S. Army all benefit fully from the investment in
training and experience.
Training
There will be a need to train and test staff to fulfill the various specialist roles outlined in this monograph. Training would be a mixture of classroom,
experiment, competitions, and highly focused self and
group study.
Training topics should include deception, counterdeception intelligence, defensive counterintelligence
(or OPSEC), active counterintelligence, rapid and deep
integration, and a variety of SIO and counter-SIO. The
integration function is the most critical—and it is here
that a coalition of experienced Soldiers and analysts
from different backgrounds can provide the feedback
that is necessary to cover all the risks, opportunities,
and combinations of circumstances.
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Materiel
Existing intelligence and other systems may be
used for SIO purposes as well as for conventional purposes. There will be a need to use existing educational
facilities intensively for seminars, competitions, and
analysis syndicates.
Leadership
In order to manage successfully the wider communities involved in the innovation and analysis
stages, there will be a need for leadership that is firmly
focused, but open minded. Retired military and civilian defense leaders might fulfill these criteria.
Personnel
Existing staff will be well-placed to become experts
at information dominance and particularly active
measures counterintelligence. There may be a need to
recruit deep specialists. It has been noted that the need
to operate in a complex environment at high tempo
places a significant burden on the integration cell, so
there may be a requirement to increase the complement of the integration staff.
During conflict and international exercises, staff
may benefit from a permanent “reachback” cadre who
can offer targeted and rapid deep research to support
decision-making and options analysis. Such a cadre
should be cross-disciplinary, with single subject matter
experts and experienced military staff (for example,
veterans) to mentor them.
The innovation, analysis, and competition cycle
will require the participation of staff from outside the
Department of Defense (DoD).
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Facilities
There are no significant facility demands, but the
training burden will increase so there may need to be
a specific IO school made available, possibly outside
DoD grounds.
Policy
There may be a need for some policy developments
to help structure the use of the relevant capabilities.
In particular, there needs to be a policy to cover the
manipulation of intelligence and the rapid prosecution
of terrorist groups using overwhelming information
attacks. Special operations and active counterintelligence should be authorized, recorded, and controlled
in a coherent fashion, according to proper policy.
Policy should enable the use of aggressive IO to
reduce the risk to Soldiers and civilians.
PART 4: CONCLUSIONS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS
Conclusions
The U.S. Army’s adversaries will exploit all available methods to hinder, degrade, and destroy the U.S.
Army’s staff and capabilities, and will use asymmetric methods throughout all phases. Because the U.S.
Army has to be highly effective in a wide range of circumstances, it must be prepared to defend its information systems against diverse information and physical
attacks, while exhibiting graceful degradation. The
U.S. Army staff must be capable of operating at near
optimum levels without the full suite of defensive,
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offensive, and communications systems; this means
that it must train accordingly, including in joint exercises. The U.S. Army should also be able to deploy
advanced special IRCs in support of its objectives, and
overwhelm the adversary’s intelligence and decisionmaking functions.
Integration staff are pivotal in the process of coordinating the significant existing conventional warfighting and information capabilities along with special capabilities. The tempo of events and speed of
advance means that this integration represents an
unprecedented challenge, so it must be supported by
preparation and early analysis. This preparation and
analysis will require the participation of a broad community, enabling the delivery of tested, robust, and
versatile effects-based capabilities.
This may require that the U.S. Army staff develop
new specialisms and career paths, providing continuous development for IO staff and further rewarding
excellence in strategic and special IO professions.
Recommendations
In order for the U.S. Army, and more broadly the
DoD and the Department of State to develop capabilities that enable information dominance to be achieved
and maintained, the authors suggest that the U.S.
Army implement the following recommendations.
Recommendation 1:
Develop and maintain a risk register that shows
the priority IO risks, including the risks that IO might
be able to mitigate. Use this register as the agenda for
competitive innovations.
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Recommendation 2:
Develop a process of iterative innovation and
analysis in order to provide an extensive portfolio of
effects-based operations that can be integrated rapidly to the Joint Plan (including during high-tempo
engagements) with the minimum load and risk to the
integration process. This will provide the commander
with options to maintain information dominance.
Recommendation 3:
Train staff in complex and multiple deceptions;
active measures counterintelligence; rapid integration;
counter SIO techniques, including full-spectrum signature warfare using research, competitions, trials, exercises, and collaboration with trusted partner nations.
Recommendation 4:
Develop reliable counter-deception capabilities
that overmatch the adversary’s deceptions.
Recommendation 5:
Apply decoys, redundancy, deception, reversionary modes, and resilient technologies to ensure
a sustainable C2 structure that can resist kinetic and
information attacks.
Recommendation 6:
Exploit advances in data management, selection,
pattern matching, and hypothesis generation by working with academia and industry, as well as continuing
to share concepts and research with partner nations.
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Recommendation 7:
Undertake competitive exercises using red teams
to attempt to penetrate and (under controlled circumstances) sabotage the U.S. Army’s own C2 and intelligence organizations and systems to identify and
mitigate the vulnerabilities. Red teams should use all
the innovative and alien concepts at their disposal.
Recommendation 8:
Encourage Soldiers to understand the value of
aggressive IO so that they can play an active part
when they are tasked by their own side, or targeted for
exploitation by an adversary.
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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS
ARCIC
C2
C4ISTAR

Army Capabilities Integration Center
command and control
command, control, communications,
computers, information/intelligence,
surveillance, targeting acquisition, and
reconnaissance
DARPA
Defense Advanced Research Projects
Agency
DoD
Department of Defense
EU
European Union
FBI
Federal Bureau of Investigation
HUMINT human intelligence
IO
information operations
IPB
intelligence preparation of the battlefield
IRC
information related capabilities
ISIS
Islamic State in Iraq and Syria
ISTAR
intelligence, surveillance, target
acquisition, and reconnaissance
IW
information warfare
MoD
Ministry of Defence
NATO
North Atlantic Treaty Organization
OPSEC
operational security
PLA
Chinese People’s Liberation Army
SIO
special information operations
STO
special technical operations
UK
United Kingdom
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